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Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States (In re SRBA Case No. 39576),
Subcase Nos. 55-10135, 55-11061, 55-11385 and 55-12452, 2007 WL
428947 (Idaho Feb. 9, 2007) (holding: (1) that a rancher's predecessors obtained water rights on federal land for stock watering by simply
applying the water to a beneficial use; (2) that water rights obtained by
ranchers are appurtenant to their patented lands; (3) that deeds to
land that do not specifically exclude water rights convey those rights;
(4) that grazing permit applications did not constitute an attempt to
abandon any water rights or preclude findings that the priority date of
a water right predated the application; and (5) that the United States
did not acquire water rights through appropriations made by individuals using the water on federal land with federal permission).
Joyce Livestock Company ('Joyce") filed a claim for instream stock
water rights in Jordan Creek, asserting a priority date of 1898. The
United States subsequently filed overlapping claims for instream stock
water rights, based on Joyce's use of the water, with a priority date of
1934. A special master heard the issue and ruled thatJoyce's claim was
inadequate, because its predecessors did not show intent to acquire a
water right by excluding others from using their water source. The
special master determined that the United States should be granted
the water right with a priority date of 1934, based on the date of the
enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act. The special master stated that
the Taylor Grazing Act demonstrated an intent to appropriate water,
through management of the rangeland and regulation of stock watering.
The District Court for the Fifth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho reviewed the special master's determinations, and held that
Joyce should be granted a water right. The district court found, however, that the earliest possible priority date that Joyce could claim was
April 26, 1935, the date thatJoyce's predecessor applied for a grazing
permit under the Taylor Grazing Act. The district court further ruled
that the United States had no claim to the water rights, because it had
not actually appropriated any water. The district court stated that the
United States could only claim water rights through Joyce's appropriation of the water ifJoyce or its predecessors were acting as agents of the
United States. Both the United States andJoyce appealed the decision.
The Supreme Court of Idaho first upheld the district court's decision thatJoyce had acquired a water right on federal land. The United
States argued that Joyce's predecessors could not obtain a water right
prior to the Taylor Grazing Act, because they did not have the right to
exclude others from the water sources located on federal lands. The
court rejected the United States' argument, reasoning that exclusive
access is not a requirement of a water right. The court cited precedent
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establishing that under the Idaho constitution, prior to the creation of
the mandatory permit process in 1971, individuals properly appropriated water for stock watering by actually diverting the water and putting it to a beneficial use. The court further ruled that the water rights
obtained by ranchers by watering their livestock on federal lands were
appurtenant to their patented properties. It stated that water rights
appurtenant to real property are conveyed with the real property,
unless the seller specifically reserves them. Since Joyce's predecessors
did not reserve the water rights in the deeds they executed to Joyce,
the court held thatJoyce was the owner of those water rights.
The court next considered if the district court properly determined
that the earliest possible priority date for the claim was 1935. The district court established this priority date because Joyce's predecessor did
not claim that he had water rights on federal lands when he applied
for a grazing permit. The court ruled that the application did not ask
if the applicant claimed any water rights, and thus Joyce's predecessor
did not abandon any water rights he may have had by failing to list
them. The question on the application asked if the applicant owned or
controlled any source of water. The court stated that since a water
right holder does not own or control the source of water, the question
was insufficient to demonstrate the existence of water rights. The
court vacated the district court's priority date, and remanded the case,
instructing the district court to consider when Joyce's predecessors
actually first made a beneficial use of the water for stock watering.
Finally, the court upheld the district court's decision that the
United States did not have a claim to water rights for stock watering.
The United States argued that when it allowed others to use the waters
on federal lands for stock watering, through the Bureau of Land Management's management plan under the Taylor Grazing Act, the United
States put the water to a beneficial use. The court rejected the United
States' argument, ruling that the United States could not claim water
rights through the beneficial use of others. Had the United States
used water on federal lands to water its livestock, it would have established a right to the water. However, under Idaho law, a landowner
does not own a water right permissively obtained on its land by another
appropriator, unless that appropriator is an agent of the landowner.
Here, Joyce's predecessors were not agents of the United States, so the
United States did not obtain a water right through their appropriations.
The United States further argued that, under the supremacy
clause, Idaho law should not be applied in interpretation of the Taylor
Grazing Act. Even though the act did not come into conflict with any
provision of Idaho water law, the United States claimed that the supremacy clause should still apply because Idaho water laws are contrary
to the purpose of the act, and would allow certain ranchers to monopolize the use of water on federal lands. The court rejected this ar-
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gument, finding thatJoyce only has a right to the water, that the right
does not give Joyce a possessory interest in the federal land, and thus
thatJoyce's right does not threaten the ability of others to use the federal lands.
The court upheld the district court's ruling that Joyce had a right
to water, and that the United States did not have a water right. It vacated the district court's priority date, and remanded for consideration
of when Joyce's predecessors actually appropriated water for stock watering.
Benjamin Skeen
In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d 75 (Idaho 2006) (holding a lake's
vegetation line may be used to determine its ordinary high water mark
only under specific conditions, and owners of lakeshore property do
not have littoral rights to exclude public from exposed lake bed between the ordinary high water mark and ordinary low water mark).
Lake Coeur d'Alene ("Lake") is a navigable lake located within the
City of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. On October 19, 2004, the city of Coeur
d'Alene and Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney initiated an action
in the First Judicial District of Idaho to determine the ordinary high
water mark ("OHWM") of Sanders Beach, which is part of the Lake's
shoreline. On June 14, 2005, Sanders Beach property owners filed a
motion for summary judgment, seeking a ruling that the owners' littoral rights permitted them to exclude the public from any exposed lake
bed between the OHWM and the ordinary low water mark ("OLWM").
The district court determined, based on the vegetation line, that the
OHWM was 2130 feet above mean sea level. In addition, the district
court rejected the property owners' right to exclude the public from
exposed lake bed between the OHWM and the OLWM. On appeal,
the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the OHWM was 2130
feet, and whether lakeshore property owners' littoral rights permitted
them to exclude the public from exposed land between the OHWM
and OLWM.
The court first addressed whether 2130 feet was the accurate
OHWM of the Lake. The court explained the vegetation line is the
line along a lake's shore resulting from water remaining at a level long
enough to deprive the underwater soil of vegetation. The court was
careful to point out that the vegetation line may be used to determine
the OHWM only in certain circumstances. The line must be at a consistent elevation along the whole lake and cannot vary from place to
place, cannot be determined by just one particular spot, and must be
the line that existed at the time the state joined the Union. The court
held that the district court erroneously used the vegetation test because it recognized varying vegetation lines along the lake, and because the court did not know the vegetation line's elevation in 1890,

